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INTRODUCTION
Since 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act' (MFA) has shielded the "business
of insurance" from antitrust liability, so long as the challenged conduct is
"regulated by State Law" and does not constitute "boycott, coercion, or
intimidation."2 This law, like the dozens of other statutory antitrust exemptions
that still exist for other industries, has more or less always been controversial,
and efforts to repeal it date back more than thirty years. Amid the past year's
intense congressional debate over health care reform legislation, a serious repeal
effort was once again afoot, and even now it continues. Because they were
linked all along to the overall health reform initiative, the repeal bills that have
been considered would apply only to carriers in health insurance and medical
malpractice insurance (MMI). In addition, depending on events that remain
hard to predict, any of them that is adopted may apply to only some of those
insurers' conduct.
If there is consensus on any one issue in antitrust, it is that statutory
exemptions are rarely justified and in most cases ought to be repealed. The
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Indianapolis School of Law, cosponsored by the American Antitrust Institute and
the Hall Center for Health Law. My thanks to organizers Bert Foer and Max
Huffman and conference participants Sydney Arak, William Comanor, John
Connor, Ted Frech, Tim Greaney, Cliff Johnson, Paul London, Emily Morris,
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
2. Id. §§ 1012(b), 1013(b).
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courts disfavor them and read them narrowly,3 the enforcement agencies have
long opposed them, 4 and they have been criticized for years by the Antitrust
Modernization Commission (AMC)5 and its many predecessors6 and by the
American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Antitrust Law.7 Other nations
generally have converged on similar views, and the European Commission now
is preparing to narrow its block exemption for insurance.' Criticism of the MFA
itself has been vigorous. Calls for outright repeal from very eminent quarters
have become routine.9
Still, much doubt remains whether any repeal effort could succeed during
the linth Congress, and events continue to unfold very rapidly. Until January or
3. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) (narrowly
construing the MFA); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733
(1973) (narrowly construing the Shipping Act of 1916); United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956) (narrowly construing the Miller-Tydings
and McGuire Act exemptions for resale price maintenance); Chi. Prof'1 Sports
Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing that because
"special interest legislation enshrines results rather than principles," the "courts
read exceptions to the antitrust laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green
eyeshades").
4. The Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department's Antitrust Division
frequently have urged Congress to repeal or narrow existing exemptions and
opposed adoption of new ones.
5. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 334-37
(2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/reportrecommendation/
amcfinal-report.pdf.
6. For histories of the many antitrust study commissions that preceded the AMC
and their opposition to statutory exemptions, see Stephen Calkins, Antitrust
Modernization: Looking Backwards, 31 J. CORP. L. 421 (2006); and Albert A. Foer,
Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 BUFF. L. REV.
1029 (2003).
7. Over many years, the ABA Antitrust Section has made clear its near uniform
opposition to all antitrust exemptions by providing testimony to Congress and in
other public venues. For a sampling of such statements, see American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law, Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/comments.shtml (last visited
July 1, 2010).
8. E.g., Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Public Consultation on Revised
Draft Block Exemption Regulation for Insurance Sector (Oct. 5, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/o9/
1413&forma.
9. The committee report accompanying the MFA repeal bill that passed the House
this year nicely summarizes this criticism, collecting evidence from an influential
1977 Justice Department report, the President's National Commission report of
1997, the National Association of Attorneys General, and the Antitrust
Modernization Commission. See H.R. REP. No. 111-322, at 4-5 (2009).
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February of 2010, the fate of MFA repeal had seemed inextricably entwined with
health care reform overall, and it endured a wildly changing and unpredictable
several months as a little noticed addendum to that larger fight. It now has been
fully extracted from the larger reform bills and will rise or fall as separate, free-
standing legislation. But, even now, the repeal effort cannot be understood
apart from the history of overall health care reform.
Identical companion bills were introduced in September 2009, that would
have repealed the MFA, but only as to health and MMI insurers, and only as to
"price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocations. '"" The House bill was reported
favorably out of committee and was included as a part of the comprehensive
health reform bill adopted in early November by the full House (the "House
Health Bill").11  The insurance industry, however, voiced predictable
opposition,12 and Senator Reid-though he cosponsored the Senate MFA repeal
bill and defended it vehemently before the Senate Judiciary Committee-
indicated in November that it was expendable if needed to secure political
compromise on the overall health care reform effort. 3 When the Senate's
comprehensive reform bill (the "Senate Health Bill") was introduced on
November 18, 2009, it did not contain MFA repeal or any other mention of
antitrust, except for two miscellaneous savings clauses. The Senate MFA repeal's
principal sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy, moved its inclusion as a floor
10. H.R. 3596, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); S. 1681, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). At least one other
bill has been introduced in this session to repeal the MFA, and it would go much
further than the health insurance bills. The Insurance Industry Competition Act
of 2009, H.R. 1583, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009), would cause antitrust to apply to the
insurance industry regardless of state regulation, subject only to the limit that
Federal Trade Commission § 5 unfair competition enforcement would remain
available only where the "business of insurance" is not "regulated by State law."
H.R. 1583's sponsors introduced the same bill in the prior Congress. See H.R. lO81,
noth Cong. (2007). Despite the fact that the bill has never received Committee
consideration, it appears to have been incorporated partly into the comprehensive
House health reform bill by manager's amendment. See infra note 24 and
accompanying text.
11. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 1ith Cong. § 262 (2009).
The House Health Bill passed the House on November 7, 2009.
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Ins. Ass'n, Health Care Bill Wrongly Targets P/C
Insurers Threatening Business Model and Competition (Nov. 9, 2009), available
at http://www.aiadc.org/aiadotnet/docHandler.aspx?DocID=3292o2 (stating
industry concerns and including a copy of a November 6 letter sent to House
members).
13. See Prescriptions, http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/1l/o8/if-anything-
the-senates-task-is-trickier/ (Nov. 8, 2009, 16:33 EST) ("Mr. Reid strongly
supports the provision, but has said he will set it aside to win [Senator Ben)
Nelson's support.").
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amendment to the Senate Health Bill, 14 and he had powerful outside support.' 5
That effort failed, though, and when the Senate Health Bill was adopted on
Christmas Eve of 2009, it contained no MFA repealer. 6 The only remaining
hope for repeal seemed to be that the House provision might be included in a
conference health bill, but that hope was slim indeed. Democratic Senator Ben
Nelson, a former insurance executive and state insurance commissioner,
publically had opposed MFA repeal. Winning his probably necessary vote for
health care reform apparently called for keeping it out of the bill, 7 and he
claimed early in the debate to have "secured assurances" from Senator Reid that
he would do so.'8 One final reason that repeal's future seemed not bright was
the suggestion that Democrats pushed it less on its merits than as a tool to
pressure insurance industry support for overall health care reform.' 9
Since then, everything has changed. Republican Senator Scott Brown's
upset election in January forced Democrats to abandon any hope of securing a
conference bill and instead to use a fairly risky and controversial budget
reconciliation strategy.2" In some respects, the lack of conference negotiation
14. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy To File Antitrust Repeal Amendment
on Today (Dec. 1, 2009).
15. See, e.g., Jesse A. Hamilton, Ten State Attorneys General Side Against Health
Insurers on Antitrust Issue, A.M. BEST BESTWIRE, Nov. 18, 2009.
16. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009). For
parliamentary reasons, the vehicle for Senate consideration of health care reform
was introduced with a House bill number.
17. See supra note 13.
18. Kristin Jensen, Senate 'Horse Trading' Begins as Democrats Take Up Health Bill,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
2o6 700o&sidahNn8gDZiDqY.
19. That argument seems to come in part from the industry, as part of its opposition
effort-the argument being that MFA repeal is simply a mean-spirited reprisal for
the industry's opposition to overall health reform. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note
15. But it has been mentioned by others as well. See Ryan Grim, Insurance Industry
Antitrust Fight Headed to Conference Committee, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 24,
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/24/insurance-industry-antitrust;
David Welna, Democrats Push To End Insurers' Antitrust Exemption, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, Oct. 23, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyld=4063950.
20. After months of debate over procedure, it became clear that congressional
leadership would use the budget reconciliation process to avoid likely filibuster of
a conference bill. Although comprehensive health care reform bills had passed
both chambers-and passed in the Senate by a filibuster-proof sixty votes-the
two bills sharply diverged on a number of hotly debated issues. Conference
negotiations surely would have been contentious, and the Democratic leadership
had hoped those discussions would be completed before the State of the Union
address in late January. See Shailagh Murray & Paul Kane, Senate Democrats Vote
To Bring Health Bill to Floor for Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2009, at Aol.
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improved the odds for MFA repeal. A free-standing MFA repealer would have
much less opposition than the comprehensive health bills faced, and therefore
the opposition of a handful of moderate Democrats to MFA repeal was no
longer a meaningful issue. In fact, as of this writing, it is still not an unlikely
outcome that free-standing repeal legislation will pass both chambers, possibly
by significant majorities. If so, it will apply only to health insurers, but it will
contain no exceptions; it will repeal their MFA immunity entirely. On February
22, 2010, after reconciliation had become a likely scenario, two freshmen
Democrats and more than seventy cosponsors introduced H.R. 4626, a free-
standing MFA repealer.2" Their bill would apply only to health insurers but
would repeal the exemption as to them totally. Within two days the bill passed
the House by an enormous margin.2" Although it remains to be seen whether
MFA repeal will fit as well into the Senate leadership's priorities, Senator Leahy
and twenty-one cosignatories wrote to Senator Reid on March 3 to urge a
Senate floor vote on the new House repealer, 3 and Senator Leahy plainly
intends to keep up the fight for a floor vote during this Congress.
Passage of any conference bill, however, seemed surely impossible after
Republican Senator Scott Brown won a special election to fill the unexpired term
of the late Senator Ted Kennedy. Instead, Democrats argued that conflicts
between the bills could be resolved by budget reconciliation-requiring only a
simple Senate majority-so long as the discrepancies related only to issues with
significant budgetary impacts. As a result of parliamentary ruling, the House was
required to pass the Senate bill verbatim, subject to reconciliation corrections, but
Democratic leaders believed they had the necessary votes in the House do to so.
See Robert Pear, Democrats Struggle To Finish Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2010, at A17; Patrick O'Connor, Pelosi: 'The Choice Has To Be Made,' POLITICO,
Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/o31o/34294-Page3.html.
21. Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, H.R. 4626, 11th Cong. (2010).
The bill was introduced by Representative Tom Perriello of Virginia and (initially)
Representative Betsy Markey of Colorado. Cosponsors included the original
sponsors of earlier repeal bills, notably Representative Peter DeFazio. See infra
note 24.
22. The floor vote in the House was 4o6 for and 19 against. Interestingly, the floor
vote on the bill was taken only after a Republican motion to return it to
committee, presumably for inclusion of exceptions or safe harbors of the kind
that had been included in the earlier House bills. Representative Dan Lungren,
who all along had been the chief advocate for safe harbors, also attempted to
amend the bill to include safe harbors while it was before the House Rules
Committee. See Press Release, Representative Dan Lungren, Lungren Fights for
Bipartisan Protection for Health Care Consumers, available at
http://lungren.house.gov/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=594&Ite
mid=86.
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This Essay asks two questions: (1) what consequences the pending repeal
measures might have if one of them becomes law; and (2) what a close
examination of this effort might teach us about the general business of MFA
repeal and competition in insurance. Teasing out the consequences is a bit
complex, because these industries are complex-health and MMI markets are
actually quite different from one another-and because the existing law under
the MFA is dense and somewhat unpredictable. In short, however, two points
seem true. Any MFA repeal in whole or in part seems desirable, as insurance
markets are riddled with competition problems, and whatever justification the
MFA ever had expired long ago. But second, the qualifications and provisos
with which the pending bills have been studded may generate disappointingly
limited results, depending on which version of the language ultimately appears
as law. By far the most stunning events in the legislative history so far were the
very quiet, little-noticed manager's amendment to the House Health Bill by
which the original limitation to "price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocation"
was removed completely, 4 and the substantially similar repeal that would apply
to health insurers under the adopted H.R. 4626. If such broad repeal language
actually becomes law, it might represent a major and welcome change with
positive competitive consequences. If not-if some version of MFA repeal
survives, but Capitol Hill negotiators reinsert limits of the repeal to specific
anticompetitive acts-repeal could well have little or no impact on these
markets at all.
As to the larger problem of MFA repeal in general, i.e., repeal as to all
conduct in all insurance markets, giving this matter close attention will repay
the effort in several ways. The pending repeal bills, however much they may
accomplish in and of themselves, have come closer to success than any prior
repeal effort, notwithstanding that efforts began more than thirty years ago.
Moreover, whether the pending repeal provisions succeed or not, they are an
important prelude to the increasingly likely, or even inevitable, general repeal of
the MFA. None of the broad antitrust exemptions, most of which date to the
24. The provision as it appears in the final House Health Bill would repeal MFA as to
"the business of health insurance [and] the business of medical malpractice
insurance." How exactly this happened remains mysterious. Representative Peter
DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon who sponsored a different MFA repeal bill, issued a
press release shortly before the House Health Bill was adopted that essentially
took full credit for the amendment, implying that the DeFazio bill itself had been
incorporated rather than H.R. 3596. See Press Release, Peter DeFazio, DeFazio
Language To Repeal Health Insurance Anti-Trust Exemption Included in Health
Reform Bill (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.defazio.house.gov/
index.php?option=com-content&view=-article&id=527:defazio-langauge-to-
repeal-health-insurance-anti-trust-exemption-included-in-health-reform-
bill&catid=6o. That claim would be quite misleading, but it is probably fair to say
that elements of DeFazio's bill were used to modify the language of H.R. 3596,
which forms the core of the repeal provision of the House Health Bill. One can
only imagine there was some sort of disagreement among bill proponents and
House leadership, and this compromise therefore was reached.
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Progressive Era and New Deal years and none of which is now very popular,
seems likely to endure. It stands to reason that the MFA will disappear
eventually as well. This recent repeal effort, the rhetoric surrounding it, and an
examination of the likely consequences of the proposed legislation present an
excellent opportunity to explore what will work and what will not in the
eventual reform.
Finally, repeal should be adopted even if the best, politically feasible option
is a bill with exceptions or safe harbors. All else aside, passage would be
symbolic. It would show the legislature's commitment to the matter. It also
would establish in effect a pilot program to show that exposure to antitrust will
not hurt insurers' ability to perform. But it should have even more concrete
benefits. Passage effectively will direct the enforcement agencies to take
insurance competition seriously, which they have not done for many years. In
that respect, incidentally, the House Health Bill originally included an
important restoration of the power of the Federal Trade Commission to
undertake industry studies in insurance, complete with the full panoply of its
investigatory powers under § 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 5
This Essay proceeds in four Parts. Part I lays out useful background
regarding the law of antitrust that currently applies to health and medical
malpractice insurers, as well as to the current economic circumstances of their
markets. Part I asks: (i) whether there is anything important about these
markets that singles them out for special antitrust exemption; and (2) whether
there is anything different enough about the two markets that dealing with
them in the same way, in the same bill, might be somehow unwise (an
argument insisted upon by industry lobbyists). Part II surveys in more detail the
legislation that has been considered in the lth Congress to set the stage for the
substantive policy analysis that comprises Part III. A brief Conclusion then
offers some broader thoughts about the general problem of repealing antitrust
exemptions.
I. THE MFA AND THE CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE
AND MMI MARKETS
After a brief pr&is of existing law, this Essay discusses the factual
backgrounds of the two quite different markets for health and medical
malpractice insurance. Part I also considers whether the differences between
them might favor differing antitrust treatment.
A. The Law as It Exists
The MFA was born at a time when "destructive competition" theory still
was taken seriously, 6 and associationalism2 7 remained an article of faith in
25. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
26. By the late nineteenth century, a remarkable consensus began to emerge among
economists that, in many sectors of the rapidly industrializing economy, very high
331
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American business; 28 confidence in them had just begun to wane in
government.2 9 By the time of the MFA's adoption, those trends already had led
fixed costs would make it impossible for more than one firm to produce goods
profitably. This was of course most commonly thought to afflict the railroads,
utilities, and other markets with very high fixed costs that are now sometimes
thought to be natural monopolies, but many economists were convinced that
similar problems would inhere through all sorts of industries. See generally NAOMI
R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-
1904 (1985) (recounting the rise of destructive competition theory).
27. Associationalism refers to the notion that social problems can and should be
handled by coalitions of private persons or entities, rather than by government.
Even though sentiments of that nature surely persist now, they were much more
pronounced during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For general
background, see Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and
the Vision of an "Associative State," 1921-1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 116,117-19 (1974).
28. Businesses had cartelized the American economy significantly in a variety of
sectors throughout the late nineteenth century. In particular, "pooling
agreements" and output-limiting cartels were common in the railroad and ocean
shipping industries. The psychological commitment of businesspeople to
associationalism had become well-entrenched at least as early as the legislative
consideration of the 1914 antitrust amendments: the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914,
Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006))
and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717.
Famously, the "Gary dinners," informal gatherings of steel industry executives to
coordinate business affairs arranged by Elbert Gary, had begun in 1907 and were
well-known to the public at that time. See JOHN D. CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST
POLICY 215 (1931). Likewise, a theoretical work by the antitrust lawyer Arthur
Eddy, which was nothing short of a blockbuster and lay the intellectual
foundations for the associationalist movement that culminated in the National
Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 703 (2006)), was published and widely read in 1912. See ARTHUR JEROME
EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION (1912). See generally H.R. Tosdal, Open Price
Associations, 7 AM. EcoN. REV. 331 (1917) (describing Eddy's book and the impact
it had on businesspeople's thinking).
In any event, testimony surrounding the 1914 antitrust amendments involved
a fair bit of such thinking and included explicit requests that any modifications to
the Sherman Act permit either open freedom to fix prices or at least provide for a
regulatory agency that could preapprove some forms of cartel agreement. See
CLARK, supra, at 139-64. The influence of these trends on the coming wave of
antitrust exemptions in the "regulated industries," including insurance, cannot be
overstated.
29. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, government
supported cartelization in a variety of ways. The most significant and visible
policy, aside from the antitrust exemptions adopted in the heavy infrastructure
industries, was the official support given trade associations under the Commerce
Secretariat of Herbert Hoover. See ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE
TRADE ASSOCIATION ISSUE, 1921-1933, at 26-53 (1993); Hawley, supra note 27, at
332
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to rate-and-entry regulation in markets throughout the United States economy,
complete with broad antitrust exemptions.30 Accordingly, while the MFA was
founded on insolvency problems unique to the insurance industry," it was but
the latest in a string of federal interventions shielding industries from
competition. The Act was just one part of a larger economic consensus dating
back decades, which only then had begun to unravel.
Still, the policy was more or less always controversial. It came under fire
from subsequent Congresses as early as 1961,32 and agitation for actual repeal
began as early as the general deregulatory fervor of the 1970s.33 Interestingly,
122-39. This "associationalist" policy culminated in the abortive National
Industrial Recovery Act of the early 193os, but its influence by no means died with
that statute.
As to the government's growing disenchantment with associationalism and
regulated cartels, in addition to the replacement of those policies with a
commitment to antitrust and competition, see SPENCER WEBER WALLER,
THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 78-82 (2005).
30. See generally AM. BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW (2007) [hereinafter ABA EXEMPTIONS
MONOGRAPH] (describing the history and politics of statutory antitrust
exemptions); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation
of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (same); Robert L.
Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986)
(same).
31. Spectacular failures occurred among fire insurers throughout the nineteenth
century, and life insurers suffered severe economic strains as well. In retrospect it
is clear that these failures reflected inadequacies of the then-current state of
actuarial science and underwriting standards and that those problems have been
improved significantly. By the time of the MFA, however, insurers had responded
to those problems mainly through horizontal price-fixing conspiracy, meant to
avoid destructive rate wars. See infra notes 47-5o and accompanying text. They did
so quite openly because, until 1944, insurance had been deemed outside the scope
of interstate commerce, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), and
therefore not subject to antitrust regulations. Paul was reversed in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), and it was directly in
response to South-Eastern Underwriters that Congress adopted the MFA.
32. See S. REP. No. 87-831 (1961) (criticizing state rate regulation regimes and
encouraging the adoption of less restrictive "file-and-use" systems).
33. See FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION OF THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF
INSURANCE (Paul W. MacAvoy ed., 1977) [hereinafter FEDERAL-STATE
REGULATION] (casting doubt broadly on the need for antitrust exemption as to
property/casualty insurers and proposing a new system of optional federal
chartering without exemption). The report appeared during the massive
deregulatory efforts of the Carter Administration. By then, economic opinion
resoundingly rejected destructive competition theory, and overwhelming evidence
had been amassed of the costs of rate-and-entry regulation. Those deregulatory
efforts have continued to this day. For the most part, rate-and-entry regulation
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
though, no serious effort at repeal legislation seems to have predated 1987. 34
Efforts began that year following a serious crisis in the pricing and availability of
liability insurance, especially among doctors, charities, and municipal
governments. The politics of that time, though, seem to have reflected not just a
desire for competitive insurance markets. They also reflected a range of
parochial interests throughout the financial sector and possibly spurious
business community interests that continue to drive tort reform rhetoric even
now.
35
Under the MFA, antitrust applies to "the business of insurance" only "to
the extent that [it] is not regulated by State law."36 In other words, for particular
conduct by insurers to enjoy exemption from antitrust, it must constitute "the
business of insurance" within the meaning of the statute, and it must be
regulated under state law. Conduct is "the business of insurance" to the extent
(1) that it "has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk"; (2)
that it "is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the
insured"; and (3) that it "is limited to entities within the insurance industry."37
Because this test is meant to exclude the "business of insurance companies,""s it
does not cover their dealings with parties that are outside the insurance
contract, and it does not cover the purchasing of goods or the provision of
services or products that do not involve the spreading of risk. At its center, the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption is meant most importantly to protect "intra-
has been removed from most industries, though vestiges of it remain in various
sectors. Insurance remains the industry probably most broadly shielded from
competition. See generally ABA EXEMPTIONS MONOGRAPH, supra note 30
(recounting the history of deregulatory efforts); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 30
(same).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 111-322, at 6-7 (2009) (recounting prior efforts at MFA repeal).
35. See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 2-4 (1993)
(arguing that the MFA was not especially contentious until after the crisis of the
mid-198os and that major agitators for MFA repeal included banks and other
institutions that wanted to sell insurance); Jay Angoff, Insurance Against
Competition: How the McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the
Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 398-402, 412-14 (1988)
(claiming that the recurrent crises in liability insurance, which have driven the
politics of MFA repeal, were distorted by insurance industry lobbying creating a
false sense of crisis in tort liability and that cyclical crises in premiums and
availability are unrelated to changes in liability claims).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2oo6).
37. Union Lab. Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
38. Id. at 132 (quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205,
217 (1979)) (emphasis added).
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industry cooperative or concerted activities" intended to help insurers cope
with risk.39
Insurer conduct is usually said to be regulated by state law, for purposes of
the exemption, merely when there is some regime of state oversight generally
relating to the conduct in question. The courts ordinarily do not inquire into
the adequacy of that regulation. 40 The law in this area, however, is fairly
confused. Although it often is said that even very general state laws only
tangentially touching the challenged conduct may be enough,41 the cases are
hard to harmonize, and courts frequently inquire whether specific state laws
alleged to regulate insurer conduct actually could do so. This fact has some
relevance to assessing MFA repeal, especially if targeted conduct remains
limited to price-fixing. By and large, only property/casualty insurers like MMI
firms have ever been formally authorized to fix prices, and price-fixing by
health insurers is subject to regulation in many states only through the
jurisdiction's general antitrust statute. 42
B. Health Insurance Versus MMI
One peculiarity of the original MFA repeal bills was their joinder of health
insurance and MMI in the same bill. It may seem to have made sense in that
repeal was part of an overall effort to reduce the cost of health care. It also may
have reflected a desire to appease doctors' groups, given their initial efforts to
make tort reform a significant part of the recent health care reform push. Or, it
may have reflected merely the 2003 introduction of an MFA repealer for MMI
insurers alone, which had followed a perceived MMI crisis in the early 2000S.4'
But, in any case, the two industries differ economically in ways that are arguably
relevant to antitrust treatment and may be significant. The issue was not
explored extensively in the legislative history, such as it is,44 and Republicans
39. Royal Drug, 44o U.S. at 222.
40. See AM. BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INSURANCE ANTITRUST 25-28
(2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ABA INSURANCE HANDBOOK].
41. See, e.g., 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 5 219C,
at 24-29 (2006).
42. Courts are split as to whether a general state antitrust statute is the "regulation of
insurance at state law." See id. 5 219C & n.86.
43. See, e.g., Medical Liability Insurance Crisis Response Act of 2002, H.R. 5253, 107th
Cong. (2002).
44. The Committee report accompanying H.R. 3596 nicely summarizes the MFA's
history and competitive problems in insurance generally. But as to the limitation
to health and MMI, it says only that it is "timely .... as Congress considers other
measures to reform the health insurance marketplace." H.R. REP. No. 111-322, at 5
(2009).
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pointed to it as a criticism of the repeal bills. 45 The consequences of repeal for
these two markets, however, call for some consideration of their differences.
On the most basic level, insurers in the two markets insure different kinds
of risk. MMI insurers are in the so-called "property/casualty" business-they
indemnify insureds when they incur liabilities to third parties. Health insurers
are not. As will be explained, 46 property/casualty insurers face economic
problems that health insurers do not, mainly reflecting the greater uncertainty
of future liability risks, as compared with future health care costs.
Next, there are differences in the ways that insurers in these two markets
cooperate and differences in the ways the law treats their cooperation. Price-
fixing is a very old tradition in insurance, but it has existed in legally sanctioned
form mainly among property/casualty insurers.47 As late as 1945, price-fixing
and extensive information-sharing were prominent only in property/casualty
markets. Thereafter, price-fixing was sanctioned legally by the states (and
therefore exempt under the MFA) almost exclusively in those lines. By contrast,
while health insurers always have collaborated to some extent in sharing
information-mainly as to historic loss experience and individual medical
histories-they have not often openly fixed their prices. At present, the only
state-sanctioned insurer price-fixing is for property/casualty lines of business.4
Moreover, even in property/casualty lines, overt price-fixing has lost some
of its effectiveness. Like other property/casualty insurers, MMI carriers were at
least traditionally heavy users of shared historic loss data and shared prospective
loss calculations. At one time-for about the first fifteen years after adoption of
the MFA-this collaborative network amounted to an unusually effective price-
fixing regime. Though the early solvency concerns that led to the MFA seem to
have been sincere, in its heyday legally sanctioned price-fixing caused the price
of insurance to increase dramatically.49 There is reason to believe that the
45. See id. at 11-13 (additional views of Rep. Lamar Smith et al.).
46. See infra notes 57-7o and accompanying text.
47. In this country the practice dates at least to the early nineteenth century and has
even earlier English antecedents. It was justified by apparently quite sincere
concerns about insurer solvency. The fear was that unrestrained price competition
would push premiums below the level that would guarantee adequate insurer
reserves to cover expected claims. Solvency was a problem particularly among fire
insurers, who suffered strings of dramatic and very visible failures during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Accordingly, fire insurers were among
those most involved in collaboration and of most concern in early insurance
regulation. See generally I JON S. HANSON ET AL., NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS,
MONITORING COMPETITION: A MEANS OF REGULATING THE PROPERTY AND
LIABILITY INSURANCE BUSINESS (1974); ABA EXEMPTIONS MONOGRAPH, supra
note 30, at 133-6o; Tim Wagner, Insurance Rating Bureaus, 19 J. INS. REG. 189
(2000).
48. See ABA INSURANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 40.
49. See Wagner, supra note 47, at 192-93.
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effectiveness of the system began to wane around 196o. Insurers continued to
share various kinds of information and therefore collaborate, but the traditional
bureau system through which they constrained their markets largely dissolved.
It has evolved into one in which a few centralized advisory organizations
aggregate historic loss data, mostly for property/casualty and workers
compensation insurers, and provide some other services.5 0
Thus, the current state of play is that most insurers collaborate at least to
the extent of sharing historic loss information, and property/casualty insurers
sometimes engage in state-sanctioned price coordination or some actual price-
fixing. Theoretically, while health insurers cannot engage in price-fixing or
price coordination legally, both kinds of insurers can share a range of
information that will vary greatly in the degree of its competitive sensitivity and
the likelihood that the collaboration would be illegal were it subject to antitrust
regulation. There is one other completely separate context in which insurers
collaborate: joint underwriting arrangements, i.e., arrangements in which a
pool of insurers jointly insure some risk. Oftentimes, joint underwriting
arrangements are required by state regulators to secure coverage of high-risk
insureds.
Finally, the health insurance business is also quite a bit more complex than
the MMI business. In particular, while some health insurance fits the simple
"indemnity" model of traditional lines like property/casualty-that is, it will
reimburse the insured when expenses are incurred-many payors of health care
costs are engaged in lines of business that are fairly different. This is especially
true of the various models of prepaid or managed health care, which are less
like the spreading of uncertain risk and more like the provision of a service for a
fee. There remains persistent doubt that lines of business such as these
constitute "the business of insurance," and that fact has some significance in
predicting the impact of MFA repeal.51
50. Traditionally both the fixing of prices and the sharing of information were
coordinated by a private entity usually called a rating bureau, a rating
organization, or an advisory organization. These entities often were required to be
licensed under state law and were subject to some state regulatory oversight,
especially when they engaged in actual price-fixing. Traditionally there were many
such entities, but, beginning in the 196os, most of them were merged into one of
the few, now national advisory organizations. The most important are two entities
that serve property/casualty insurers, the Insurance Services Office and the
American Association of Insurance Services, and another that serves workers
compensation insurers, the National Council on Compensation Insurance. Each
of these entities is organized separately from their insurer clients and sells its
services to them. See Wagner, supra note 47, at 198-200. Health insurers, too, have
made use of either public loss-related information or medical history and loss
information shared by insurers through "medical information bureaus," but they
have not engaged generally in open rate-fixing or advisory pricing.
51. Again, MFA repeal during the 111th Congress aims to contribute to overall health
care reform. But it will have no effect on those aspects of prepaid, managed, or
other health care products provided by insurance companies that do not involve
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C. The Character of Health Insurance Markets
Although there is some small debate regarding competitiveness in health
insurance-in particular over the concentration evidence-no one seems to
question seriously that the market circumstances are deplorable. By most
accounts, health insurance markets are severely concentrated: Ninety-six
percent of all health insurance markets are "highly concentrated," at levels
often far exceeding the thresholds that trigger antitrust concerns. And if any
change is likely, it is only that they will become more concentrated. There have
been more than 400 mergers among health care insurers in the past 14 years.
52
Trends in affordability and availability of health insurance also have come to
pose serious problems of income disparity. 3
As one might guess, given severe concentration and antitrust exemption,
there also is evidence of serious collusion. First, there has been significant
market allocation, most prominently the decades-old, nationwide system
imposed by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) on its member
plans. BCBSA has acknowledged the system's existence and that it includes
agreements between BCBSA entities and third-party insurers that they will not
compete, as well as that it divides up insurance markets across the country.5 4
Second, as evidenced by frequent litigation, there apparently has been
substantial collusion as to price, services, and terms, some of it held to be MFA-
immune, but some outside of any likely MFA protection. Finally, profits among
the spreading of risk and therefore do not constitute "the business of insurance."
As to doubts whether prepaid or managed care constitutes "the business of
insurance," see ABA INSURANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 40, at 23-24.
52. See generally AM. MED. Ass'N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF U.S. MARKETS, 2007 UPDATE (2007) (discussing
competitive circumstances in health insurance markets); COMMON DREAMS.ORG,
STUDY: HEALTH INSURERS ARE NEAR MONOPOLIES (20o6), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlineso6/o418-o9.htm (same); HEALTH CARE
FOR AM. Now, PREMIUMS SOARING IN CONSOLIDATED HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKET: LACK OF COMPETITION HURTS RURAL STATES, SMALL BUSINESSES 7-8
(2009) [hereinafter HCAN REPORT], available at http://hcfan.3cdn.net/
dadd15782e627esb75g9m6isltl.pdf (same).
53. See Byron G. Auguste, Martha Laboissihre & Lenny T. Mendonca, How Health
Care Costs Contribute to Income Disparity in the United States, McKINSEY Q.,
March 20o9, at 1 (presenting evidence that the poor are drastically more likely to
lack insurance and that, when they have it, their coverage is much less desirable
and the portion of their income they must pay to secure it is much larger than for
the wealthy).
54. The history of this conspiracy is recounted in Maryland v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass'n, 62o F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1985).
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the largest health insurers have increased dramatically-more than 400 percent
since 20oo-and executive compensation is also very high."
D. Markets for MMI
The discussion in this Section takes a somewhat deeper look at MMI, as
health markets are understood better than MMI and because MMI markets
pose certain economic problems not felt by health insurers. Still, though, the
point ultimately will be that for antitrust purposes the details should not really
matter. Those problems that do exist in MMI, and that may be different than
those faced by health insurers, would seem poorly addressed through any sort
of industry collusion requiring antitrust immunity. In other words, although
there is something special about MMI and other property/casualty lines, that
unique status is no justification for antitrust immunity.
1. Special Problems in the Market
Nearly all health care providers (including hospitals and other institutions)
purchase MMI, as it ordinarily is required by professional ethical rules and
hospital privileges requirements.56 But the history of this market, especially in
the past forty years, has involved substantial volatility and change. As a result of
the so-called "insurance cycle" or "underwriting cycle," which is observed in all
property/casualty lines, these markets are prone to extreme variability in both
the premiums charged and the insurers' economic performance. 7 Interestingly,
the insurance cycle in MMI follows closely the overall cycle of all liability
insurance, but its peaks and valleys are more extreme.5s
55. See HCAN REPORT, supra note 52, at 7-8.
56. MICHELLE MELLO, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER 1 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/
files/research/no8primer.pdf.
57. The insurance cycle is the oscillation over time between "soft" and "hard"
markets. In soft periods, insurers enjoy comparatively good investment returns
and compete vigorously for insureds by lowering premiums. Soft markets are
followed by hard markets, in which insurers compensate for worsening conditions
(increasing expected losses or decreasing expected investment returns) by raising
premiums, tightening underwriting standards, and restricting availability. See
Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 393, 394 (2005) ("A 'hard' turn in an insurance underwriting cycle comes
when insurers collectively respond to the fact that the prevailing premiums
cannot support future claims payments, whether because claims costs have been
higher than projected or investment income has been lower than projected, or
some combination of the two.").
58. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE
FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 33 (2003)
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Volatility in MMI has led to three significant "crisis" periods in recent
decades, during which premiums rose sharply, and the availability of coverage
dried up: the mid-197os, the mid-198os, and the early 20oos. Each of these
periods witnessed dramatic incidences of insurer failure or withdrawal from
malpractice lines. Physicians' mutuals-nonprofit malpractice insurance
companies owned by doctors-primarily have taken their place. Mutuals now
insure about sixty percent of all physicians in private practice. Likewise, many
hospitals and groups of hospitals or doctors now self-insure. 9 In any case, we
are arguably in the midst of one continuing "crisis" right now. Malpractice
insurers' loss costs began rising significantly in the late 199os, and premiums
have increased dramatically since a sharp spike that occurred in 1999 and 2000.
There is extraordinary variation, however, across states in the degree of both of
these increases; no one is quite sure why.6"
No one can say yet what causes the insurance cycle or even how much of
the variability in premiums and profits it explains. The cycle might arguably
have antitrust relevance, because one persistent explanation for its existence is
in effect a destructive competition argument. During the "soft-market" period
of the cycle, the argument goes, comparatively good circumstances for insurers
cause them to compete by excessive price-cutting-which they find for whatever
reason irresistible-the result being premiums that are too low given expected
loss costs.6' The problem is exacerbated by special traits of MMI risks that
render MMI products harder to price even relative to other property/casualty
products. MMI risks are uncommonly "long tailed"; resolution of claims
requiring actual payout takes on average five years from occurrence and may
take as long as ten.62 Also, the claims themselves are both uncommonly variable
and are the subject of much smaller datasets than is common in most other
[hereinafter GAO, MULTIPLE FACTORS], available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d037o2.pdf.
59. Id. at 6.
60. See id. at 18-21. Ordinary increases in the value of claims would be expected as the
cost of medical care itself rises and as the value of lost wages rises. But the increase
in loss costs in some states has far outpaced this inflation. Possible, but so far
uncorroborated, explanations include increased propensity to sue, an aging
population, or decreasing quality of medical care. See id. at 24.
61. A persuasive theoretical basis for the proposition that "hard" turns in MMI
markets are uncommonly "hard" and therefore tend to call for sudden,
unexpected, and large requirements to acquire new capital reserves is set out in
Baker, supra note 57, at 399-401; and Anne Gron & Andrew Winston, Risk
Overhang and Market Behavior, 74 J. Bus. 591 (2001). See also Scott E. Harrington,
Patricia M. Danzon & Andrew J. Epstein, "Crises" in Medical Malpractice
Insurance: Evidence of Excessive Price-Cutting in the Preceding Soft Market, 32 J.
BANKING & FIN. 157 (2OO8) (explaining the argument and adducing limited
evidence).
62. The somewhat nonintuitive consequences of this problem are explained very
nicely in Baker, supra note 57, at 399-401; and Gron & Winston, supra note 61.
340
28:325 2010
MUCH ADO ABOUT POSSIBLY PRETTY LITTLE
property/casualty lines.6" The datasets are so small and unpredictable, in fact,
that insurers do not even bother with experience-rated premium adjustments
for individual practitioners.6 4 In any case, there is some limited empirical and
anecdotal evidence said to be consistent with the destructive competition
view.6" This imprudent competition at least conceivably might be softened by
industry cooperation, which in turn might require antitrust exemption.
Other factors, though, cast doubt on this view. First, it may well be that
prospective medical malpractice losses are uncommonly hard for actuaries to
estimate. But deliberate pricing likely to produce severe market turns, with the
associated likelihood of insolvency, is still difficult to explain without assuming
some significant, systematic irrationality throughout MMI markets. Though a
large appetite for risk is not in itself irrational, that appetite should be
moderated by a more or less random distribution of risk aversion across
insurance executives. There is no reason to expect, especially among publicly
traded stock-company MMI firms, a distribution different from that of the
population at large. Moreover, while predicting the actual timing and severity
of hard-market turns is impossible, insurers surely know they are coming; they
often have the benefit of decades of experience and a huge empirical and
theoretical literature. Accordingly, if one firm is driving prices too low by
excessive risk-taking, we should then see exits from the market before hard-
market turns. Instead, we observe quite the opposite. Thus, most observers
acknowledge that the mere facts of long tails and loss cost volatility should not
in themselves produce a cycle, as opposed to conservative pricing. They also
acknowledge that the actual explanation for the cycle remains unknown.66
Moreover, there is plenty of reason to believe that rational but not
procompetitive behaviors contribute to cycle problems. Some of this
phenomenon may be explained by income-smoothing accounting gimmickry.6 7
There also is a straightforward collusive explanation. MMI insurers know that,
because of the MFA and laws in many states that allow property/casualty price
coordination, they can regroup following a soft-market period of competitive
expansion and protect themselves by collusive price increases. Evidence exists to
63. See GAO, MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 58, at 8.
64. See MELLO, supra note 56, at 1. "Experience rating," which is common in
automobile, homeowners, and some other insurance lines, is the process by which
loss estimates as to a particular insured class are changed on the basis of claims
made by that class over time.
65. See GAO, MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 58, at 30-31 (collecting anecdotal views
of industry participants); Harrington et al., supra note 61 (reporting empirical
results arguably consistent with excessive soft-market price cutting but admitting
the severe limitations of available data and acknowledging that most premium
variation is probably explained by ordinary competitive market factors).
66. See, e.g., MELLO, supra note 56, at 11-12. Again, a very careful elaboration of the
problem is in Baker, supra note 57, at 402-04.
67. See Baker, supra note 57, at 402-03 & n.29.
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corroborate this pattern, precisely at the beginnings of even recent hard-market
turns.
68
Likewise, a factor that has not yet been incorporated sufficiently in the
insurance-cycle literature is that MMI and other property/casualty lines remain
among the most heavily rate-regulated insurance lines.69 The influence of rate
regulation on insurer performance seems supported by the fact that both
premiums and insurer profitability are highly variable from state to state.
Finally, a fact arguably at odds with the destructive competition theory is
the general agreement that MMI premiums mostly reflect those forces one
would expect in functional competitive markets. Variation in premiums is
explained mostly by changing predictions of future loss based on loss
experience and the discount rate reflecting expected investment income.7 °
2. Competitive Problems
It is generally thought that property/casualty markets are fairly competitive
and, in any case, should be more competitive than health care markets have
been.2' But MMI markets still display competitive problems and possibly worse
ones than in other property/casualty sectors. First, MMI markets have been
prone at various times to significant concentration. This outcome may reflect in
part the fact that they suffer more volatile hard-market swings, which are
followed by insolvencies and exits, leaving remaining incumbents with larger
market share and other competitors that are capacity-constrained by solvency
regulation.
Moreover, even though the strength of the traditional price-fixing system
has faded,72 there is reason to believe that mere information-sharing could
dampen competition in MMI markets. Insurer advisory organizations still
68. See Angoff, supra note 35, at 406-08.
69. Importantly, insurers must reflect expected investment income in premiums, i.e.,
they must reduce premiums when returns are expected to be high, but cannot
raise premiums to reflect lower than expected returns in the past. See GAO,
MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 58, at 26. Insurers also are capacity-constrained,
because regulators set a maximum amount of insurance they can write according
to their reserves. So if, as often happens, some insurers exit following a period of
declining profits, remaining insurers not only enjoy decreasing competition as a
result of exit, they also are artificially protected from supply substitution. See id. at
31.
70. Harrington et al., supra note 61, at 168. In competitive markets with low
transaction costs, insurance premiums should equal the risk-adjusted discounted
value of expected loss, plus the costs of sales and underwriting, taxes, and other
costs, and, in the case of for-profit stock insurers, a competitive return on capital.
See id. at 16o.
71. See, e.g., Angoff, supra note 35.
72. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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aggregate property/casualty loss data and still develop prospective pricing aids,
including techniques such as shared "loss development factors" and "trending"
formulas. Such tools might be effective price coordination aids, especially
during the immediate shock of a hard-market turn and during the less
competitive hard-market phase of the insurance cycle. These tools also might
well be illegal in the absence of exemption, under cases like American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States.7 1
II. THE PENDING LEGISLATION
As originally introduced in identical versions as House Bill 3596 and Senate
Bill 1681, the MFA repealer of 2009 was a very short bill. It would have repealed
the MFA for health and MMI insurers but only as to "price fixing, bid rigging,
or market allocations."7 4 The limitation to specified kinds of conduct has a long
lineage, dating to bills of the late 198os and 199os associated with House
Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks. But, as initially introduced, the
current bill's specified types of conduct would have been narrower than in those
earlier bills.75 In any case, the 2009 bill included two other brief sections, one of
which specified that its purpose was to prevent conduct "to the detriment of
competition and consumers,"76 the other clarifying that it would have no effect
on the immunity of state government insurance regulators.
73. 257 U.S. 377 (1921). In American Column, the Court found per se illegal a trade
association arrangement under which the association collected detailed historic
data from members and then distributed forward-looking price predictions that
the Court decided were price-coordination tools. See Angoff, supra note 35, at
404-06, for a description of how the sharing of historic loss data and the
development of forward-looking pricing formulas could be used to coordinate
prices as effectively as the arrangement in American Column.
74. H.R. 3596, llith Cong. § 2 (2009); S. 1681, i1th Cong. § 2 (2009).
75. Brooks, a socially liberal Democrat from Texas, served in Congress for more than
forty years before losing his seat during the Republican uprising of 1994. He
chaired the House Judiciary Committee from 1989 until his failed reelection bid.
An MFA repealer had been introduced in the immediately prior Congress but did
not leave the House committee. See Fairness in Insurance Act of 1987, H.R. 2727,
iooth Cong. (1987). Brooks introduced substantially identical repeal language in
the next three Congresses, and in 1993 this bill finally was reported to the full
House and incorporated into the Clinton Administration's health care reform
effort. See Health Security Act, H.R. 36oo, 103d Cong. (1994). Each time, the
Brooks bill would have repealed the MFA only for specified conduct. The kinds of
conduct identified, however, would cover most insurer conduct that could result
in antitrust liability: price-fixing, market allocation, tying of insurance to other
products, and monopolization. Brooks's bills also would have repealed the MFA
for all insurers. See Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1993, H.R. 9, 103d Cong.
(1993); Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1991, H.R. 9, 102d Cong. (1991);
Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1989, H.R. 1663, lOlst Cong. (1989).
76. H.R. 3596 § 2.
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The bill passed out of the House Judiciary Committee only after an
amendment offered by a conservative Republican from the Sacramento area,
Representative Dan Lungren. Nominally, the Lungren Amendment did no
more than harmonize House Bill 3596 with the Brooks bills; it was introduced at
the end of a brief markup hearing, where it merely incorporated verbatim
protections that had been thought important in those bills,77 and it aroused no
opposition. Oddly enough, Representative Lungren's addition seemed to have
been defended as a tribute to Brooks's memory.7s In any case, its sole
modification was to add three "safe harbors" for specified insurer conduct: (i)
the sharing of historical loss data; (2) determining a "loss development factor"
applicable to historical loss data; and (3) performing actuarial services.79
The House Judiciary bill was incorporated by Speaker Nancy Pelosi, acting
as floor manager, into the House Health Bill. As mentioned, that incorporation
was the most significant event to occur in the legislative history, as it included a
manager's amendment that modified the coverage of the repealer. Whereas it
originally repealed the MFA only with respect to "price fixing, bid rigging, and
market allocation," the amended version applied to all of "the business of health
insurance,... [and] the business of medical malpractice insurance.' '"° In other
words, it would repeal the MFA entirely within those markets, subject only to
the safe harbors introduced by the Lungren Amendment.s" Though the details
77. Hearing Transcript, Full Committee Markup of H.R. 3596, at 43:00-47:45 (Oct. 21,
2009) (statement of Rep. Daniel Lungren), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/mark091o21.html (describing the amendment as "exactly the same" as
prior legislation and meant merely to avoid "the law of unintended
consequences" and harm to small insurance companies).
78. See Full Committee Markup of H.R. 3596: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, nlth Cong. 30-31 (2009) (statement of Rep. Daniel Lungren, Member,
House Comm. on the Judiciary).
79. H.R. 3596 § 5.
80. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, uith Cong. § 262(b) (2009).
81. As it appears in the House Health Bill, the repealer would add a subparagraph to §
3 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (20o6), providing in full as
follows:
(c)(i) Except as provided in paragraph (2), nothing contained in this
Act shall modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the
antitrust laws with respect to price fixing, market allocation, or
monopolization ....
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to-
(A) collecting, compiling, classifying, or disseminating
historical loss data;
(B) determining a loss development factor applicable to
historical loss data; or
(C) performing actuarial services if doing so does not involve a
restraint of trade.
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remain undisclosed, the resulting product appears to have merged the language
and structure of H.R. 3596, as it was voted out of the House Judiciary
Committee, with language from a comprehensive MFA repeal bill introduced
by Representative Peter DeFazio.82 The bill, with that manager's amendment,
passed the House on November 7, 2009.
The House Health Bill included a few other antitrust improvements.
Section 262 added two provisions, one that would clarify new powers of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) over health and MMI insurers and a second
that includes a general antitrust savings clause."s Rather more important, one
separate section of the bill, not included in the original Judiciary bill, would
restore some of the FTC's authority to "conduct studies and prepare reports"
(3) For purposes of this subsection-
(A) the term 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in
subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act, except that
such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
to the extent that such section 5 applies to unfair methods of
competition;
(B) the term historical loss data means information respecting
claims paid, or reserves held for claims reported, by any person
engaged in the business of insurance; and
(C) the term loss development factor means an adjustment to
be made to the aggregate of losses incurred during a prior period of
time that have been paid, or for which claims have been received are
being held, in order to estimate the aggregate of the losses incurred
during such period that will ultimately be paid.
H.R. 3962 § 262(a).
82. See DeFazio, supra note 24.
83. To wit they provide:
(b) Related Provision-For purposes of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent such section applies to
unfair methods of competition, section 3(c) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act shall apply with respect to the business of health insurance, and with
respect to the business of medical malpractice insurance, without regard
to whether such business is carried on for profit, notwithstanding the
definition of 'Corporation' contained in section 4 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
(c) Related Preservation of Antitrust Laws- Except as provided in
subsections (a) and (b), nothing in this Act, or in the amendments made
by this Act, shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
operation of any of the antitrust laws. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, the term 'antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in subsection
(a) of the first section of the Clayton Act, except that it includes section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act to the extent that such section 5
applies to unfair methods of competition.
H.R. 3962 § 262(b)-(c).
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concerning "the business of insurance."' 4 The Commission's power in this
respect had been curtailed through uncommonly surgical amendments by a
fairly hostile Congress in 1980.5 In effect this provision would give back the
FTC's significant sua sponte equitable power to require information reporting
in health and MMI markets.86 Because these FTC provisions did not appear in
the Senate Health Bill, however, and because they would not affect the federal
budget substantially, they could not be added to the Senate Health Bill through
reconciliation. They are therefore presumably dead.
In any case, the event even more significant than Speaker Pelosi's manager's
amendment was the introduction of the free-standing H.R. 4626 by
Representatives Perriello and Markey. This bill would repeal the MFA entirely,
with no exceptions or safe harbors, though it would apply only to health
insurers."s
Action in the Senate on MFA repeal has been much more restrained. The
original Senate companion MFA bill, S. 1681, was the subject of a Judiciary
Committee hearing, but it saw no other action until early December 2009, when
Senator Leahy proposed it as an amendment to the Senate Health Bill."8 The
Senate Health Bill was passed without that amendment, however, and so far
there has been no Senate consideration of H.R. 4626. Still, one supposes that
given the overwhelming House support for H.R. 4626-it passed by a vote of
84. Under the amendment to be made in the House Health Bill, the FTC would have
authority to conduct studies:
and prepare reports, and to share information under clauses (f)
[authorizing public reporting of information that is "in the public
interest"] and (k) [authorizing referral of evidence for criminal
prosecution], relating to the business of insurance. Notwithstanding
section 4, such authority shall include the authority to conduct studies
and prepare reports, and to share information under clauses (f) and (k),
relating to the business of insurance, without regard to whether the entity
or entities that is the subject of such studies, reports, or information is a
for-profit or not-for-profit entity.
H.R. 3962 § 260.
85. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 198o, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §
5(a), 94 Stat. 374, 375 (drastically limiting such investigations, allowing them only
when requested by either the House or Senate Commerce Committees or under a
few other circumstances.); 6 EARL W. KINTNER & WILLIAM P. KRATZKE, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW § 43.44 (1986).
86. Section 6 gives the Commission broad investigatory powers, which can be used
either to support an enforcement action against a particular entity or to require
periodic industry reporting. See generally United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632 (1950) (laying out the Court's view of the Commission's statutory powers
of investigation); KINTNER & KRATZKE, supra note 85, §§ 45.23-45.24 (surveying
case law and the statutory bounds of Commission's investigatory powers).
87. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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406 to 19-and given the general unpopularity of broad antitrust exemptions,
the bill's prospects have at least become brighter.
III. ANALYSIS
The main question for the future is whether any repeal provision likely to
be adopted will really generate any change. As it turns out, that question is
really not one of examining the purportedly peculiar economics of health care,
or even the special problems of the insurance cycle. It takes just a close analysis
of the actual language likely to be adopted and how it would affect conduct that
insurers actually undertake. On the one hand, it seems extremely unlikely that
exposure to antitrust under the language of any likely MFA repealer would
impede useful behavior. Although it is true that all insurers collaborate to some
degree-a fact they stress at great length in opposing any MFA repeal-most of
their collaboration would not pose even trivial risk of antitrust liability. Sharing
of retrospective loss information is by wide consensus procompetitive and
unlikely ever to face antitrust challenge. But on the other hand, the limited
amount of additional antitrust exposure under many of the proposed repeal
bills probably would not do much good. This conclusion is warranted for two
reasons. First, because repeal may be limited to some set of specified
anticompetitive practices, other anticompetitive problems-some of which
appear to be quite serious-will remain exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Second,
some of the specified conduct to which repeal would apply is in fact not
immune under current law.
A. Undue Antitrust Risks?
The industry's lobbying response is familiar from many prior legislative
struggles, concerning repeal not only of the MFA but also of the various other
antitrust exemptions. The major argument appears to be that increased
exposure to liability will chill procompetitive arrangements8 9 Whatever its
merits, this argument probably is taken least seriously by most observers,
including members of Congress from both parties. Doubts about chilled
competition are familiar, and, in the case of insurance, the skepticism dates at
least to a careful Justice Department study undertaken in 1977.90
In its most plausible form, the argument is that insurers need access to the
largest possible pool of historic loss data to make better actuarial predictions
and that in property/casualty lines the lack of such information can have
disastrous consequences. The argument is given a competitive tone in that
access to large pools of data is said to limit what otherwise could be significant
entry barriers for small entrants.
89. See sources cited supra note 12.
90. FEDERAL-STATE REGULATION, supra note 33, at 91-145.
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It is true that MFA repeal would expose some conduct that is currently
exempt to antitrust scrutiny. As mentioned, health and medical malpractice
insurers engage in a fair amount of information-sharing and also underwrite
some risk though joint underwriting arrangements.9 ' Because underwriting is
pervasively state-regulated, all such conduct is currently exempt from antitrust
under the MFA. The problem is that information-sharing of this variety is very
unlikely to be illegal even without antitrust immunity. The least sensitive and
most obviously procompetitive information-sharing involves historic loss data
for better actuarial estimation. It is extremely unlikely under United States v.
Container Corp. of America92 or the Supreme Court's other information-sharing
case law that any such conduct could be held illegal. The sharing of historic
price data is also probably not illegal, especially if it is not very detailed, and
especially if it is simply aggregated and then disseminated without client-
identifying information by some advisory organization or trade group.93 It also
may be permissible, when insurers create arrangements for sharing these kinds
of information, to establish reasonable membership rules that would exclude
some competitors from accessing their information. 94
The sharing of prospective price information would of course pose more
legal risk. This would be true of agreements to aggregate "prospective loss cost"
predictions, wherever those predictions could be used by insurers to calculate
each other's future prices in facilitation of a price-fixing conspiracy. But it
hardly would be an adverse result to scrutinize such conduct more closely.
Moreover, no matter how procompetitive information-sharing might be,
there is no plausible narrative by which any insurer collaboration could be
defended as necessary to solve insurance-cycle problems. That is, to the extent it
were argued that MMI insurers need antitrust exemption to deal with the
insurance cycle, the argument is weak at best. Even if there is some dysfunction
in these markets-as would be suggested by destructive competition theories of
the insurance cycle or by theories of information failure-it is unlikely that any
sort of industry collaboration is the solution. The MFA and state regulations
have given MMI insurers sixty years during which to collaborate, including in
91. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
92. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). Container Corp. held that where the characteristics of some
particular market would tend to favor oligopoly interdependence, an agreement
to exchange information that could facilitate oligopoly pricing might be illegal
under the rule of reason. Id. at 334-35.
93. Compare American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
(enjoining a trade association's "open price plan," under which the association
collected extensive price information and disseminated detailed, prospective
reports to its members predicting future prices), with Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (reversing an injunction against a trade
association that merely collected historic price data and disseminated to members
aggregated, nonspecific, and retrospective reports of price trends).
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some states through freedom for outright horizontal price-fixing. Their
experience nevertheless has been very poor.
B. The Limitations to Specific Conduct: Price-Fixin& Bid Rigging, or Market
Allocation
Again, the MFA repeal adopted by the House, following a significant
manager's amendment, is total-it would repeal all immunity as to the
"business of health insurance [and] the business of medical malpractice
insurance." 95 The same consequence would follow from the Perriello-Markey
bill (H.R. 4626), though it would apply only to health insurers. Yet there
remains some serious possibility that language of this breadth will not survive
even if some repeal bill becomes law because of the Senate's apparently more
limited interest in repeal. No repealer was included in the final Senate Health
Bill, despite significant efforts to include one, and no Senate consideration has
been given to the Perriello-Markey bill.
If repeal is limited to "price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocation," it
would not change antitrust exposure much, especially in health markets. Health
insurers are not now-and for the most part never have been-legally
sanctioned to fix their prices. Therefore; they are already subject to some federal
antitrust for price-fixing. In fact, there are even now pending several price-
fixing suits against WellPoint, Inc. and other major health insurers. 6 For this
reason-that MFA repeal only regarding price-fixing would not outlaw any
conduct that is not already illegal-the Congressional Budget Office cost
estimate accompanying H.R. 3596 suggested that the bill likely would have little
effect on premiums or insurers' costs. 97
Second, the chief problem in health insurance now is not obviously
conspiracy, but rather may be monopoly and interdependent oligopoly
behavior. Although the evidence is in some dispute, there is no serious doubt
that health insurance markets are concentrated and growing more so. Powerful
incumbents in such markets might take unilateral action to exclude new
competitors, but under McCarran-Ferguson such actions will at least
95. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 262(b) (2009).
96. These disputes are known as the so-called "Ingenix" litigation. The defendant
health insurers are accused of using of a database maintained by one of them to
set their permissible reimbursement levels for services received from "out-of-
network" doctors. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants agreed simply to falsify
data in the Ingenix database to keep those reimbursements artificially low. These
cases have been consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs are the
American Medical Association, regional medical associations, and individual
physicians. See In re WellPoint, Inc., Out-of-Network "UCR" Rates Litigation, 652
F. Supp. 2d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2009).
97. H.R. REP. No. 111-322, at io (2009).
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sometimes be immune from Sherman Act § 2 challenge. 9' The conduct-specific
repeal bills would not correct that problem. Specifically, incumbent insurers
might take "exclusionary" steps akin to the maligned most-favored-nation
clauses in provider contracts or exclusive agreements with agents and providers.
There is limited case law on whether such conduct is the "business of
insurance," but at least some of it surely is. 99 Accordingly, under several of the
bills that have been proposed, many or all of these practices would remain
immunized even after repeal.
Finally, there might be some information-sharing arrangements among
insurers that are in fact anticompetitive' ° ° and that might violate antitrust were
there no immunity. It would seem beneficial if antitrust law were available to
curb that conduct. But if an MFA repealer is made applicable only to price-
fixing or the other enumerated practices that have appeared in various bills,
such anticompetitive conduct might still be immune under the remaining MFA
immunity. A court would have to decide whether in any particular case insurers
sharing too much information were truly engaged in (i) some sort of conspiracy
that actually fits within one of the specified kinds of sanctioned conduct; or (2)
a mere agreement to share excessive amounts of sensitive information. If only
the latter, it might still have been illegal under Container Corp. and the Court's
other information-sharing cases but probably would be immune under the
MFA and any MFA repealer. In other words, there may be some
anticompetitive information-sharing among insurers that is exempt now and
would remain exempt under some versions of MFA repeal.
C. The Safe Harbors
One separate problem has persisted throughout the debate; there have been
repeated efforts to include in any MFA repealer some set of safe harbors for
specified types of information-sharing. For example, under the broad repeal
provision included by manager's amendment in the House Health Bill, antitrust
98. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
99. Strictly speaking, in order for insurer conduct to be exempt under McCarran-
Ferguson, it must not only be "the business of insurance" but also must not
constitute "boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Id. § 1O13(a)-(b). Some
exclusionary conduct by insurers might constitute "boycott, coercion, or
intimidation," and indeed that phrase is sometimes (incorrectly) said to have been
interpreted broadly. But it appears that this exception to the MFA exemption
applies only to concerted conduct among two or more insurers. Moreover, the
conduct must involve collective refusal to deal with some third party on a
transaction that is separate from "the terms of the primary insurance
[transaction]." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 806-07 (1993).
See generally ABA INSURANCE HANDBOOK, supra note 40, at 28-31.
OO. For example, insurers might not only aggregate historic loss data, they might also
exchange forward-looking price-sensitive information or pricing formulas that
could allow price coordination.
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law would have applied to the entire "business of health insurance [and] the
business of medical malpractice insurance," but it would not apply to: (1)
aggregation of historical loss data; (2) sharing of a loss development factor
(LDF); or (3) performing actuarial services. Safe harbors might seem to make
sense, given the consensus that some insurer information-sharing is
procompetitive. Indeed, the American Bar Association (ABA) historically has
advocated replacing the MFA with a series of safe harbors rather than full MFA
repeal, and the House of Delegates long ago adopted a recommended list of
them.'0 ' The safe harbors in the House Health Bill, however, were quite
different than the ABA version, which is couched in cautionary language.
Notably absent from the House provision is the following principle from the
ABA document:
Insurers should be authorized to cooperate in the collection and
dissemination of past loss experience data so long as those activities do
not unreasonably restrain competition but should not be authorized to
cooperate in the construction of advisory rates or the projection of loss
experience into the future in such a manner as to interfere with
competitive pricing.'°2
Accordingly, the LDF provision seems troubling. LDF is defined in the House
Health Bill as:
an adjustment to be made to the aggregate of losses incurred during a
prior period of time that have been paid, or for which claims have been
received and reserves are being held, in order to estimate the aggregate
of the losses incurred during such period that will ultimately be paid.03
Again, though insurer advisory organizations have become much less
restrictive than in the days of the "bureau" system, °4 it seems conceivable that
aggregation of historic data and the sharing of a properly designed LDF could
be used to coordinate future prices. 5 Such a scheme might be illegal if it were
not for the remaining MFA immunity left under the House Health Bill.
ioi. See The Health Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2009, Hearing on
H.R. 3596 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary 8 (2009) (statement of Ilene Knable Gotts, Chair, ABA
Section of Antitrust Law) (quoting American Bar Association House of Delegates
Resolution (Feb. 1989)), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/
Gottso9loo8.pdf.
1o2. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, lith Cong. § 262(a) (2009).
104. See supra notes 47-50.
105. Angoff, supra note 35, at 405-06, explains very nicely just how this could be
accomplished.
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CONCLUSION
Health insurance reform without some major effort to constrain monopoly
and collusion seems likely to fail. A broad repeal provision like the one in the
House Health Bill or the Perriello-Markey bill could go some way toward
preventing that failure. Repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act could lead to at
least three predictable changes. First, any current, outright price-fixing should
end (except those practices that become covert). Second, both health and
medical malpractice insurers would be more cautious about how they handle
themselves when sharing information. Their legitimate information exchanges
almost certainly would still be legal. They would, however, be aware that their
behavior in collaborative joint underwriting deals and their exchanges of
purportedly legitimate underwriting data might be scrutinized more closely for
antitrust violations. Insurers might therefore be more careful not to engage in
information dissemination that could violate the rule of reason under Container
Corp. Finally, both kinds of insurers would be more concerned about their own
unilateral conduct that could be found "exclusionary." The reason is that some
exclusionary conduct is probably immune under the MFA as it currently exists;
that conduct probably constitutes "the business of insurance" and is regulated
by some states. Therefore, a partial, conduct-specific repeal provision might
leave this sort of conduct still immune.
Although only time will tell, in the event that any repeal language is
adopted, it still might be rewritten to apply only to specified sorts of conduct. If
language is chosen like that in the original repeal bills of September 2009, then
repeal may fail altogether. It would not much affect the behavior of health
insurers, and, though it could constrain extant legally sanctioned MMI price-
fixing, the most likely bill to pass (the Perriello-Markey bill) would not apply to
them either. Even then, it probably would have little effect on the prices of their
products.
In one final sense, the most important lesson from this complicated
political drama relates to the general business of MFA repeal. Like the other
classic antitrust exemptions, the MFA seems fated eventually to disappear
entirely. If history is any guide, it will fade gradually, and the industry will kick
and scream through the entire process. But at least two points are clear in light
of the health and MMI repeal effort. First, there are important differences
among different kinds of insurers, and some consideration must be given to
whether those differences justify differential antitrust treatment. Insurers will
argue that they do, and, at a minimum, ferreting out the consequences will be
complex. The analysis in this Essay suggests that although those differences
exist, they call for no special treatment. Second, if repeal is phrased with
qualifications, provisos, and other statutory nooks and crannies-an approach
that often seems designed only for political palatability-the consequences are
complicated and very difficult to predict. Ordinarily, such semantic tinkering
would dampen the beneficial effects of repeal. The much better course is simply
a wholesale repeal of the MFA, and that result is warmly supported by just
about everyone except for the insurers themselves.
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